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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a default judgment of the Third
Judicial District.

This court has jurisdiction pursuant to

U.C.A., 1953, § 78-2-2 (3)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court err in finding that defendants

failed to show or represent that the contents of the requested
documents might be incriminating?
2.

Did the trial court err in determining that defendants

failed to provide sufficient information from which the trial
court could make an intelligent evaluation of defendants1 claim
of privilege against self-incrimination?
3.

Did

defendants waive their claim of privilege by

asserting in deposition that they had very few dissatisfied
customers and by identifying their sales records as the basis for
this assertion?
4.

Can defendants claim the privilege as to partnership

records of which defendants are the custodians?
5.
Utah's

Were plaintiffs required to allege their claims under
former RICE statute with the same particularity

as

required for a grand jury to indict a criminal defendant?
6.

Are defendants entitled to attorney fees on appeal?

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The relevant constitutional and statutory provisions are as
follows:

1.

United States Constitution, Amendment V:

"No person

. . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself ...."
2.

U.C.A., 1953, § 76-10-1601 et seq (as enacted at time

of plaintiff's complaint).

See addendum at 1-4.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.
Below

Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition

Plaintiffs sued defendants' partnership and partners for
fraud in the sale of investment real estate.

The defendants

refused to produce certain partnership documents based on their
privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to
the federal constitution.
The trial court evaluated defendants' self-incrimination
claims and found them to be groundless.

The court ordered

defendants to produce the documents, and defendants again refused
to do so.

The court held an evidentiary hearing, made findings

of fact and conclusions of law, and ordered that defendants'
answer be struck and default judgment entered.

Defendants appeal

this order.
B.

Relevant Facts

Defendants Steve Holcomb and Bruce Honey were partners in
and real estate agents/brokers for defendant Vantage Income
Properties ("Vantage'*), a real estate broker partnership.

In

1985 defendants acted as the principal real estate brokers or
agents of the owners of certain investment real estate located on
2

Vine Street in Murray, Utah.

This real estate consisted of

apartment complexes, a triplex, and a duplex.

(Record

2-4

(hereinafter "R."); Addendum 5-7 (hereinafter "Add.")-)
Defendants approached plaintiffs Marion Webb and Jill Brown
about purchasing the investment real estate.
experience

and sophistication

Plaintiffs lacked

in the purchase

and sale of

investment real estate, and defendants knew this.

Defendants

also knew that plaintiffs did not have the economic means to
service the debt on the property.

Defendants represented to

plaintiffs that debt service would not be a problem because
plaintiffs could resell the property at a profit a few weeks
after purchasing it.

Defendants represented that the property

had a positive cash flow and that it had been appraised at over
$1,000,000.

(R. 3-8; Add. 6-11.)

Defendants knew that the foregoing representations were
false.

In fact, the property had a negative cash flow, had not

been appraised at over $1,000,000, and was actually worth only
about $550,000.

(R. 4-7, 9; Add. 7-10, 12.)

Defendants also

made other false representations that will be discussed in the
Argument, Point V, infra.
Relying upon defendants' false representations, plaintiffs
purchased the property for $780,000 and hired defendants as their
brokers to resell the property.

Defendants failed to locate a

ready, willing, and able purchaser who would pay over $1,000,000
for the property.
property

was

Defendants eventually told plaintiffs that the

worth

less

than what
3

plaintiffs

paid,

and

recommended to plaintiffs that they sell it at a loss.

(R. 7, 8-

9, 11-12; Add. 10, 11-12, 14-15.)
Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit, alleging claims for civil
violation of Utah's former Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Enterprises Act1 (RICE), fraud, constructive fraud, and negligent
misrepresentation.
damages.

Plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive

(R. 2-17; Add. 5-22.)

At his deposition, Steve Holcomb asserted that Vantage had
very few dissatisfied customers and identified Vantage's sales
records as evidence of this.

Holcomb stated:

A
Our company was very proud of the fact that in the
hundreds of apartment houses that we sold, we had very few
people that were dissatisfied with the service that we had
performed.

A
Most real estate agents sell one or two buildings
in their career and that's it. People that worked for me
did business with their customers over and over and over.
Our business was about 70 percent repeat business.

Q
You have referred to the fact that about 70
percent of your business was repeat business. Did you have
some sort of a customer list of the people who you were
doing most of your business with? Again, I'm referring to
VIP [Vantage Income Properties].
A
I think I got that figure from a list of sales
that we had made at one time during the year, and I could
look back to see who the people were that bought the
buildings and where we had met them and how many they bought
from us, and it was about 70 percent.
1

U.C.A., 1953, § 76-10-1601 et seq.
This Act was
subsequently revised and renamed the Pattern of Unlawful Activity
Act (PUA). See § 76-10-1601 et seq. (as amended). References in
this brief to RICE should, where the context requires, be
interpreted to also refer to the PUA Act.
4

(Deposition of Steve Holcomb at 48, 54, 59; Add. 21-23.)
Holcomb also disclosed that in at least two instances
Vantage had purchased

properties back

from customers.

He

testified that there might be other instances, but he could not
remember them.

(Deposition of Steve Holcomb at 84-88; Add. 24-

28. )
To verify the truth of Holcomb's statement that very few of
Vantage's customers were dissatisfied, and to check out why some
customers had sold their properties back to Vantage, plaintiffs
sought to obtain the sales records identified by Holcomb so that
plaintiffs could contact those customers directly.

In February

1987 plaintiffs served requests for production on Honey, Holcomb,
and Vantage requesting, inter alia, the record for all sales at
Vantage and the names of all of Steve Holcombfs customers while
he was at Vantage.
simply

(R. 63; Add. 29-30. )

At first, defendants

failed to produce these documents.

Such failure to

respond was part of a continuing pattern of failure to respond to
discovery requests.

(See R. 32-33, 58-59, 103-104.)

Later,

defendants refused to produce the documents, claiming the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Plaintiffs brought a series of motions to either compel
production or to strike defendants' answer
produce.

for refusal to

The trial court granting these motions in a series of

five orders.

(R. 89-90; 139-141; 196-98; 217; 258-63; Add. 31-

5

32, 40-46, 49-54. ) 2

For purposes of this appeal, the trial

court's orders and the defendants' responses to these orders can
be simplified down to the following:
(A)

Defendants

failed to respond

to the requests to

produce, and the trial court ordered production.

(R. 89-90; Add.

31-32.)
(B) Defendants refused to produce the documents based on
their privilege

against

self-incrimination

under the Fifth

Amendment to the federal constitution;3

2

Order
No.

These five orders were as follows:
Date

Description of order

4/9/87

Order compelling response to requests
for production (R. 89-90; Add. 31-32.)

10/26/87

Order that defendants explain their
assertion of privilege against selfincrimination (R. 139-141; Add. 40-42.)

12/15/87

Order granting plaintiffs' motion for
sanctions conditioned on defendants'
failure to produce documents within 10
days (R. 196-98; Add. 43-45.)

2/1/88

Minute entry granting judgment for
plaintiffs on RICE claim (R. 217; Add.
46. )

3/28/88

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Default Judgment on Plaintiffs'
First Cause of Action (R. 258-63; Add.
49-54. )

3

Defendants claim on appeal the privilege against selfincrimination under article I, section 12 of the Utah
Constitution. Defendants did not make such a claim before the
trial court. (R. 120, 178; Add. 34.)
6

(C) The trial court ordered defendants to provide sufficient
information from which the court could make an intelligent
evaluation of their claim of privilege (R. 139-41; Add. 40-42);
(D) In a written response to the requests to produce,
defendants set forth the basis for their claim of privilege (Add.
33-39- );
(E) The trial court ruled defendants1 written statement of
their claim to be insufficient and ordered defendants to produce
the documents (R. 196-98; Add. 43-45);
(F) Defendants refused to produce the documents; and
(G) The trial court struck defendants' pleadings and granted
judgment for plaintiffs on their RICE claim.

(R. 217, 258-63;

Add. 46, 49-54.)
The trial

court's

third order

contains the

following

pertinent findings of fact and conclusions of law (R. 197; Add.
44. ):
1.

Defendants had not validly claimed the privilege

because they "had failed to show and would not represent that
there is anything contained within

[the] documents that is

incriminating."
2.

Plaintiffs had a right to verify Holcombfs deposition

statements concerning repeat business by obtaining copies of the
sales records identified in the deposition.
3.

By making the statements at his deposition concerning

Vantage's satisfied customers, Holcomb had waived his right to

7

assert the privilege against self-incrimination as to the sales
records and customer lists substantiating his statement.
4.

Defendants did not supply sufficient information from

which the court could make an intelligent evaluation of their
claim of privilege.
Prior to making its final order, the trial court held an
evidentiary hearing on damages and took testimony from plaintiff
Marion Webb.

In its fifth and final order the trial court made

the following findings of fact and conclusions of law, which
support its third order (R. 259-61; Add. 50-52):
1.
lacked

Defendants knew or had reason to know that plaintiffs
business

experience, knowledge

and

sophistication

concerning purchasing and operating rental income property or
real estate generally, especially buying and holding real estate
for the short term.
2.

Plaintiffs

bought

the

property

because

of

the

representations of defendants; without such representations,
plaintiffs would not have purchased the property.
3.

Defendants defrauded plaintiffs.

The court ordered that the answer of defendants Bruce Honey
and Vantage be stricken as to plaintiffs' RICE claim.4

It is

from this fifth order that Honey and Vantage appeal.

4

Judgment as to defendant Holcomb was reserved because of
his pending bankruptcy.
In August 1988 that bankruptcy was
dismissed.
In September 1988 the same judgment was entered
against Holcomb.
8

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
To properly invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, a defendant must generally show (1) that a
response might be incriminatory,
criminal prosecution.

and

(2) a possibility of

The trial court found that defendants

failed to show the first element, and this finding is supported
by the record.

Also, the record shows that defendants failed to

show the second element.
An additional requirement applicable to this case, since it
deals with production of documents, is to show that such
production would be a testimonial communication.

Here production

would not have been a testimonial communication, since the
documents were already identified in prior testimony.
A defendant waives his privilege against self-incrimination
by putting forth his own version of the facts.

Defendants waived

their privilege in this case as to Vantage's sales records by
Holcomb's deposition statements based on those records.
An additional ground not considered by the trial but upon
which the trial court's ruling can be sustained is that a
custodian of partnership records may not claim the privilege as
to partnership records in his possession.

The disputed records

in this case were the sales records of Vantage, and therefore
this rule applies.
Plaintiffs'

RICE

allegations

traditional pleading standards.

are

sufficient

under

This Court should decline to

adopt the standard articulated in Bache Halsey-Stuart Shields
9

Inc. v. Tracy Collins Bank & Trust Co., 558 F. Supp. 1042 (D.
Utah 1983), which has been rejected by numerous courts.
Under the American rule, defendants are not entitled to
recover attorney fees on appeal.

Defendants are not penalized by

having to pay their own attorney fees.

ARGUMENT
POINT I:

Standard of Review

In reviewing a default judgment entered as a sanction for
refusal to produce discovery, the appellate court takes the
allegations of the complaint as true and conclusive as to the
facts.

United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 96 N.M. 155,

629 P.2d 231, 316 (1980), appeal dismissed, 451 U.S. 901 (1981).
See also Brown v. Kenron Aluminum and Gas Corp., 477 F.2d 526
(8th Cir. 1973); Olsen v. Kirkham, 720 P. 2d 217 (Idaho App.
1986).
POINT II: The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Defendants'
Claim of Privilege under the Fifth Amendment
The trial court did not err in denying defendants1 claim of
privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment.
The trial court's ruling is in accordance with federal law
governing (A) the claim of privilege generally and (B) the claim
of privilege in response to requests to produce documents.
A.

Claim of the Privilege Generally

At the outset, it should be noted that defendants' claim of
privilege before the trial court was based solely on the Fifth
Amendment to the federal constitution, and not on article I,
10

section 12 of the Utah Constitution.

(R. 120, 178; Add. 34.)

The first time that defendants have claimed the privilege under
the Utah Constitution is on appeal.

Defendants are precluded

from doing so under this Court's rule that appellants may not
raise issues on appeal that were not argued before the trial
court.
This Court has previously had occasion to grapple with the
scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege.

In First Federal Savings

& Loan Association v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1984), this
Court thoroughly analyzed the leading federal cases governing the
assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege.

The general rule

culled from those cases was stated as follows:
The privilege may be invoked if an answer might
incriminate and there is some possibility that a
criminal action might be filed.
684 P.2d at 1262 (emphasis in original omitted), citing, inter
alia, Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374-75, 71 S. Ct.
438, 442-43 (1951).

In other words, the two requirements for

claiming the privilege are (1) that the response sought might
incriminate and (2) that there is a possibility of criminal
prosecution.
Regarding the first requirement, it need only be evident
from the implications of the question asked that a responsive
answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be
answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure might
result.

684 P.2d at 1263, quoting United States v. Hoffman, 341

U.S. 479, 486-87, 71 S. Ct. 814, 818-19 (1951).
11

It is not

enough,

however,

to merely

declare

that

an

answer

will

incriminate:
To sustain an assertion of the privilege against
self-incrimination, a party must show that the
r e s p o n s e s sought to be compelled might be
incriminating. This requires . • . "at minimum, a good
faith effort to provide the trial judge with sufficient
information from which he can make an intelligent
evaluation of the claim."
[684 P.2d at 1266-67
(quoting Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1160 (9th
Cir. 1981)).]
It is the trial judge, and not the claimant, who is the final
arbiter of the claim.
Regarding

Id.

the second requirement, the possibility of a

criminal prosecution must be a "real danger," not a "mere
imaginary possibility."

Id., quoting Rogers v. United States,

340 U.S. 367, 374-75, 71 S. Ct. 438, 442-43 (1951).

Again, this

would also require a good faith effort to provide the trial judge
with sufficient information to determine that the possibility of
criminal prosecution is real and not merely imaginary.
In this case, defendants have failed to satisfy either of
these requirements:
1.

Showing that response might incriminate.

The trial

court found that defendants had failed to show and would not even
represent that the contents of the documents might incriminate
them.

(R. 197; Add. 44)

A review of defendant's response to

plaintiffs1

request for production shows this finding to be

supported.

At most, the defendants1 response gives a theoretical

explanation of how the documents could be used to incriminate
defendants; nowheye does it show or affirmatively represent that
12

the

contents might

be

incriminating.

(See add.

33-37.)

Accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded that defendants
had failed to supply sufficient information from which the court
could make an intelligent evaluation of their claim.

(R. 197;

Add. 44.)
2.

Showing possibility of criminal prosecution.

The

defendants also failed to show or even represent that there
existed any real danger of criminal prosecution.

Nowhere in the

record did they disclose the possibility of a pending criminal
investigation or even that the police had talked to them.

Their

response shows that, at most, the possibility of such prosecution
is an "imaginary possibility."

Although defendants assert that

Mr. Newton threatened to get Mr. Holcomb "off the streets, " and
imply by this assertion a threat of criminal prosecution, the
trial court's ruling rejects such an implication.

The trial

court's finding on this point should be sustained.
In other words, the trial court's ruling is a determination
that defendants' claim of privilege was not genuine but merely
another attempt to frustrate the discovery process.

Defendants

could have shown their claim to be genuine in a number of ways,
such as showing the documents to the trial court in camera,
disclosing

whether

they were

subject

to a pending

police

investigation, or otherwise making some effort to explain how the
contents of the documents might actually be incriminatory and how
defendants were actually in danger of criminal prosecution.
Defendants failed to make any such effort.
13

Absent this, the

trial court was justified under the federal authorities reviewed
in Schamanek in denying defendants' claim of privilege.
A case factually similar to this case is Davis v. Fendler,
650 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1981), in which the defendant was served
with interrogatories and at first objected to them without making
a claim of privilege.

Later the defendant claimed the privilege

because he was involved in a simultaneous, overlapping criminal
action.

The trial judge ordered the defendant to set forth his

claims of privilege more specifically so the judge could assess
their merits.

Defendant responded with "answers" that simply

restated the same objections that the trial judge had found
insufficient.

The district court struck defendant's answer and

entered default judgment against the defendant for $37.9 million.
The appellate court affirmed, stating:
[T]he district court did not abuse its discretion in
entering default judgment against appellant.
The
sanction was imposed because of [defendant's]
persistent unresponsiveness to both informal discovery
requests and formal court orders. [650 F.2d at 1161.]
In this case, as in Davis v. Fendler, defendants did not at
first claim the privilege, but simply failed to respond to the
requests

to produce.

Furthermore, defendants

engaged

"persistent unresponsiveness" to discovery requests.

in

Over and

over defendants failed to respond to discovery requests until
motions to compel were filed against them.
89-90,

103-104.)

(See R. 32-33, 58-59,

Thus, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in granting default against defendants.

14

On appeal defendants again do not affirmatively assert that
the contents of the documents might incriminate them.

Instead,

they reiterate their abstract argument that since plaintiffs
could use the contents of the documents to prove their civil
claims under

RICE, which has a criminal

counterpart, the

documents could, in theory, be used to incriminate them.
If this argument were accepted, it would have far-reaching
effects on discovery effort in civil claims under RICE or any
other civil cause of action, such as fraud, that has a criminal
counterpart.

It is clear that every defendant of such a claim

could assert the privilege on the same basis as the defendants in
this case, i.e., they could assert that in theory their responses
to discovery could be used to prove the elements of the criminal
counterpart.

If such a theoretical assertion of the privilege is

sustainable, then all defendants of such civil claims could shut
down discovery efforts against them even though a real threat of
criminal prosecution does not actually exist.

Plaintiffs ask the

Court not to open up such a Pandora's box, which could end up
undoing RICE and all other civil claims that have criminal
counterparts.
Moreover, contrary to defendants' argument plaintiffs have
not sought the documents solely to prove RICE.

Plaintiffs have

sought the documents to verify the statements of Holcomb that
over 70% of his customers were repeat business.
relevant

That issue is

not only to plaintiffs' RICE claims but also to

plaintiffs' fraud claims and prayer for punitive damages.
15

B.

Claim of Privilege in the Context
Produce.

of Requests to

When the privilege is claimed in response to requests to
produce documents, an additional requirement exists.
Court observed in Schamanek,

As this

"the Fifth Amendment does not inde-

pendently proscribe the compelled production of every sort of
incriminating evidence but applies only when the accused is
compelled

to

incriminating."

make

a testimonial

communication

that

is

684 P. 2d at 1264, quoting Fisher v. United

States, 425 U.S. 391, 408, 96 S. Ct. 1569, 1579 (emphasis in
original).
In other words, since the Fifth Amendment only proscribes
being compelled to be a witness against oneself, the production
of documents falls within its scope only if such production has a
testimonial aspect.5

The documents themselves, since they are

already in existence, cannot be considered as testimony.
Thus it has been held that to sustain the privilege in
response to a request to produce documents, a court must both
find the contents of the documents to be incriminating and find
that

the

act of producing

communication.

the documents

is a testimonial

Whether the act of production is testimonial

depends on the facts of the case.

684 P.2d at 1264; see Fisher

v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410, 96 S. Ct. 1569, 1581 (1976).

5

The same requirement would apply under article I, section
22 of the Utah Constitution, which this Court has interpreted to
be no broader than its federal counterpart.
Sandy City v.
Larson, 733 P.2d 137, 138 (Utah 1987); see First Federal Savings
v. Schamanek, supra.
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In this case, the trial court's ruling supports the view
that production of the documents would not be a testimonial
communication.

In his deposition, Holcomb had already testified

as to the existence and identity of the documents sought through
the requests to produce.

Given this prior testimony, production

of the documents would not also be a testimonial communication as
to the existence or identity of the documents.
Therefore, based

on this additional

requirement

that

production of a document be testimonial in nature, the trial
court's ruling should also be sustained.
POINT III:

Defendants Waived their Right to Claim the Privilege
Against Self-incrimination

The trial judge also ruled that defendants waived their
right to claim the privilege against self-incrimination by virtue
of Holcomb's deposition statements asserting that Vantage had
very few dissatisfied customers and identifying the sales records
as the source of such information.

This ruling was justified

under the law and facts of the case.
It has been held that the disclosure of a fact waives the
privilege against self-incrimination as to the details of the
fact.

Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 373, 71 S. Ct. 438

(1951); In Re Corrugated Container Anti Trust Litigation, 661
F.2d 1145, 1158 (7th Cir. 1981).

A contrary rule would "open the

way to distortion of the facts by permitting a witness to select
any stopping place in the testimony."
supra, 340 U.S. at 371.

Rogers v. United States,

Thus, a witness who voluntarily

testifies on his own behalf waives the right to invoke the
17

privilege as to matters raised by his own testimony.

In choosing

to testify, a witness must weigh the advantage of raising the
privilege against the advantage of putting forth his own version
of the facts.

Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 155-56

(1958); In Re Candor Diamond Corp., 42 B.R. 916 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1984).
In this case, Holcomb chose to put forth his own version of
the facts, i.e., that very few of Vantage's customers were
dissatisfied.

In addition, he revealed that certain customers

had sold their properties back to Vantage.

Therefore, it is only

fair that plaintiffs be allowed verify Holcomb's version by
obtaining copies of the sales records identified by Holcomb so
that plaintiffs can contact those customers.

As mentioned

previously, these lists could provide information relevant not
only to plaintiffs' RICE claim, but also to plaintiffs claim for
fraud and prayer for punitive damages.

If, contrary to Holcomb's

statement, many of Vantage's customer were dissatisfied, and that
is the reason Vantage repurchased their property, it is possible
that Vantage engaged in the same fraudulent practices against
these customers as against the plaintiffs.

Such a pattern of

fraud would justify an award of punitive damages and would
substantiate plaintiffs' fraud claim as well as the RICE claim.
POINT IV: Defendants Can Not Claim the Privilege for Partnership
Documents
This Court has often held that it will affirm a trial
court's decision whenever it can do so on a proper ground, even
though it was not a ground on which the trial court relied in its
18

ruling.

E.g., Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neeley Construction

Co., 677 P.2d 1120, 1123 (Utah 1984); Rice, Melby Enterprises v.
Salt Lake County, 646 P.2d 696, 698 n.3 (1982).

Such a ground

may be considered even though it is raised for the first time on
appeal.

Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Associates, 752 P.2d 892, 894-

95 (Utah 1988).
In this case, such an additional, proper ground to sustain
the trial court exists.

The rule is well-accepted, known as the

"collective entity" rule, that where production of corporate or
partnership records is sought, an individual holding such records
in a representative capacity cannot claim the privilege against
self-incrimination to avoid producing the records, even though
the records might incriminate him personally.

Bellis v. United

States, 417 U.S. 85, 88, 94 S. Ct. 2179, 2183 (1974); Braswell v.
United States, 108 S. Ct. 2284 (1988); 81 Am. Jur. 2d Witnesses §
48 (1976).
In Bellis v. United States, supra, the United States Supreme
Court ruled that a partner in a three-man partnership could not
rely on the privilege against self-incrimination as grounds for
refusing to produce partnership records.

The Court applied the

collective entity rule even though the partnership had been
dissolved.

The rationale for the rule was that the privilege

against self-incrimination applies only to natural persons and
not artificial organizations.

It followed that

[s]ince no artificial organization may utilize the
personal privilege against compulsory selfincrimination, . . . an individual acting in his
official capacity on behalf of the organization may
19

likewise not take advantage of his personal privilege.
[417 U.S. at 90, 94 S. Ct. at 2184.]
The Court further justified the rule by looking to the
policy underlying the privilege, which is the protection of
personal

privacy.

Artificial

organizations,

partnerships, are entitled to no such privacy.
92, 94 S. Ct. at 2184-85.

such

as

417 U.S. at 91-

Indeed, by statute they are often

required to make their records available to inspection of their
members or others.

Accordingly, artificial organizations and

their representatives

should not be allowed

to invoke the

privilege.
In Braswell v. United States, supra, the Court reaffirmed
the rule in Bellis.

In Braswell

the person claiming

the

privilege was the sole shareholder of a family corporation who
had been subpoenaed to turn over corporate records to a grand
jury.

The Court held that, regardless of whether a subpoena is

addressed

to the organization or to the individual

in his

capacity as a custodian, a custodian of organizational records
may not resist a subpoena for those records by asserting the
privilege against self-incrimination.
In the instant case, the rule articulated in Bellis and
Braswell directly applies.

Plaintiffs' request for production

sought partnership records, i.e., the record of Vantage's sales.
Honey and Holcomb possessed such records as representatives of
the partnership.

Therefore, under Bellis and Braswell Honey and

Holcomb are precluded from asserting the privilege against selfincrimination, even though they could be personally incriminated
20

by such production.

On this additional ground, the trial court's

ruling should also be upheld.
POINT V:

Plaintiffs Have adequately Pleaded Civil RICE

Defendants argue on appeal that this Court should reverse
because plaintiffs have not properly alleged a "pattern of
racketeering activity" under Utah's former Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Enterprises Act (RICE), U.C.A., 1953, § 76-10-1601 et
seq.

Section 1602(4) of that act provided:
"Pattern of racketeering activity" means engaging
in at least two episodes of racketeering conduct which
have the same or similar objectives, results,
participants, victims, or methods of commission, or are
o t h e r w i s e i n t e r r e l a t e d by
distinguishing
characteristics and are not isolated events . . . .
The statute defines

"racketeering

activity" as an act

committed for financial gain which is illegal under the laws of
Utah

"regardless of whether such act is in fact charged or

indicted," and which involves one of a laundry list of illegal
acts.

Included in this list are (1) a scheme or artifice to

defraud, (2) resale of realty with intent to defraud, and (3)
false statements concerning land for sale.

§ 76-10-1602(p), (q),

(s).
Although

the

liability

created

by

this

statute

was

denominated as "racketeering," it would more accurately termed as
liability for statutory fraud or other unlawful conduct.

The

successor to RICE has adopted this view by renaming the act as
the "Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act."
this view of the statute, stating:
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The trial court took

I prefer to call [this action] a . . . statutory fraud
cause of action, because that's really what it is. . .
. I prefer to use that term rather than racketeering.
[Trial Judge's Ruling, February 9, 1988, at 4, 5; Add,
47-48.]
Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint eight episodes of
"racketeering," or as the trial court viewed it, statutory fraud,
as follows:
1.

Defendants falsely represented that the roofs on the

apartment buildings needed only "a couple buckets of tar" to
repair them when in fact the cost to repair the roofs was over
$40,000.
2.

(R. 6, 10-11; Add. 9, 13-14.)
Defendants falsely represented that plaintiffs would

not be required to pay real property taxes for five years when in
fact real property taxes were due annually.
3.

(Id.)

Defendants falsely represented that the cost to re-

meter each rental unit was $150.00 when in fact such cost
exceeded $250.00. (Id.)
4.

Defendants falsely represented that the property had

been appraised in excess of $1 million when in fact it had not.
(Id.)
5.

Defendants falsely represented that the income from

the property exceeded the expenses thereon.
6.

Defendants

falsely represented

(Id.)
that if plaintiffs

executed certain promissory notes, which notes plaintiffs did not
have the present ability to pay, repayment would not be a problem
because defendants guaranteed that the property would be sold
within a couple of weeks.

CR. 9-11; Add. 12-13.)
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7.

Defendants

induced

plaintiffs

to execute

other

obligations that plaintiffs did not have the present ability to
pay.

(R. 8, 10-11; Add. 11, 13-14.)
8.

Defendants stated that the property was worth less

than what plaintiffs had paid and that now plaintiffs should sell
it at a loss.
Defendants argue that in order for plaintiffs to properly
allege

RICE, the

foregoing

episodes must be alleged with

sufficient particularity to satisfy a "probable cause" or "prima
facie" standard necessary to obtain an indictment under Utah's
grand jury statute, U.C.A.,

1953, § 77-11-5.

Defendants'

argument relies entirely on a Utah federal district court case,
Bache Halsey Stuart Shields Inc. v. Tracy Collins Bank & Trust
Co., 558 F. Supp. 1042, 1045 (D. Utah 1983).
This Court should decline to adopt the pleading requirement
articulated in Bache Halsey.
1983,

Since Bache Halsey was decided in

numerous other courts have considered its approach and

expressly refused to follow it.

Haroco, Inc. v. American

National Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), aff yd
473 U.S. 606 (1985); Meyer v. First National Bank & Trust Co.,
698 F. Supp. 798, 806-807 (D.N.D. 1987);

Rhoades v. Powell, 644

F. Supp. 645, 670 n. 20 (E.D. Cal. 1986); Cincinnati Gas &
Electric Co. v. General Electric Co., 656 F. Supp. 49, 77 (S.D.
Ohio 1986); Lewis v. Sporck, 612 F. Supp. 1316, 1324 (N.D. Cal.
1985); Tryco Trucking Co. v. Belk Store Services, Inc., 608 F.
Supp. 812, 815-16 (W.D. N.C. 1985); Schnitzer v. Oppenheimer &
23

Co., 633 F. Supp. 92, 96 (D. Ore. 1985).
The reasons for not following Bache Halsey are strong.

If a

plaintiff were required to establish probable cause or a prima
facie case at the pleading stage, he would essentially have to
plead evidence and prove his case before filing the complaint.
This is not possible for civil plaintiffs, who, unlike grand
juries, do not have any discovery mechanism available to them
prior to filing the complaint.

This concept was well explicated

by the court in Haroco, Inc. v. American National Bank & Trust
Co., 747 F.2d 384, 404 (7th Cir. 1984), wherein it stated:
With respect to Bache Halsey's discussion of grand
juries, it should be recalled that a grand jury has
significant investigative powers and resources,
including a broad subpoena power. Before it decides
whether to indict a person, it has extensive
opportunities to discover and evaluate relevant facts.
It should be obvious that a civil plaintiff has no
similar discovery rights until it files the complaint.
Yet the approach of the district court in Bache Halsey
appears to require a plantiff to establish a case
before any discovery is permitted.
. . . While the
court's motives [in Bache Halsey] are admirable, its
approach seems to us to be impractical.
We see no
grounds for demanding that a civil RICO plaintiff
essentially plead evidence and prove the case in the
complaint.
Under any other standard than Bache Halsey, the allegations
of plaintiffs1 complaint would be considered sufficient.

This

Court should not impose the additional, unreachable standard
created by Bache Halsey.
POINT VI:

Defendants Are Not Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal

Finally, defendants request that they be awarded attorneys
fees on appeal.

Plaintiffs strongly oppose this request.

Under the "American" rule, followed by this Court, attorneys
24

fees are awarded only when provided for by contract or by
statute*

E.g., Golden Key Realty v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730 (Utah

1985); Utah Farm Production Credit Assoc, v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62
(Utah 1981).

Defendants do not cite such a contractual or

statutory provision, nor do they cite any authority to vary the
American rule in this case.
Defendants rely on Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967),
for the general proposition that a person claiming the privilege
should not be subjected

to a penalty.

From this general

proposition defendants argue that if they are forced to bear
their own attorneys fees on appeal, that would amount to a
penalty, and that therefore plaintiffs should pay defendants*
fees.
Defendants1 reliance on Spevack is entirely misplaced.

In

that case, a lawyer who claimed the privilege was ordered to be
disbarred.

The United States Supreme Court held that the threat

of disbarment constituted a "penalty" tantamount to compulsion,
and thus was impermissible.

There is nothing in Spevack remotely

supporting defendants' argument that they are somehow subject to
a penalty by having to bear the costs of their own appeal.
"[N]ot every undesirable consequence which may follow from
the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination can be
characterized as a penalty."
(1st Cir. 1974).

Flint v. Mullen, 499 F.2d 100, 104

Certainly there can be no penalty where

defendants are simply required to do what all litigants do, which
is to pay for their own attorney fees.
25

CONCLUSION
The trial court's ruling is sustainable on four grounds:
(1) defendants failed to show they might be incriminated; (2)
defendants

failed to show the real possibility of criminal

prosecution;

(3) defendants waived their right to claim the

privilege; and (4) defendants cannot claim the privilege as to
partnership records in their possession.
Accordingly, the trial court's ruling should be affirmed.
DATED this V ^

day of

HltfrJg-

., 1989.

James L. Ch^/stensen
Paul D. Newron
Mark J. Morrise

PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAILING
The undersigned, attorney for plaintiffs and respondents,
hereby certifies that on June S r 1989, he caused the foregoing
"Brief of Respondent" to be served on all parties to this appeal,
by mailing copies thereof by first-class mail, postage prepaid,
on the following:
Attorney for Defendants
Michael S. Eldredge
SNOW & HALLIDAY
Attorney for Appellants
261 East 300 South, Suite 350
Salt Lake City, Utah

Dated

'

Mark J. Moftrise
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ADDENDUM
[This addendum is consecutively numbered, with page numbers
at the top center of each page. The record numbers appear in the
lower right-hand corner of the page.]
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of the owner of the property or the bus company, or its duly authorized representative is guilty of theft and shall be punished pursuant to section 76-6-412.
History: L. 1979, ch. 72, § 8.
76-10-1509. Obstructing operation of bus. Any person who unlawfully
obstructs or impedes by force or violence, or any means of intimidation, the regular
operation of a bus is guilty of a class C misdemeanor.
History: L. 1979, ch. 72, § 9.
76-10-1510. Obstructing operation of bus — Conspiracy. Two or more persons who willfully or maliciously combine or conspire to violate section 76-10-1509
shall each be guilty of a class C misdemeanor.
History: L. 1979, ch. 72, § 10.
76-10-1511. Cumulative and supplemental nature of act. The provisions of
this act shall be cumulative and supplemental to the provisions of any other law
of the state.
History: L. 1979, ch. 72, § 11.
PART 16
RACKETEERING ENTERPRISES
Section.
76-10-1601.
76-10-1602.
76-10-1603.
76-10-1604.
76-10-1605.

Short title.
Definitions.
Unlawful acts — Felony — Forfeitures.
Enforcement authority of peace officers.
Remedies of person injured by pattern of racketeering activity — Authorized
orders of district court.
76-10-1606. Payments to general fund of state.
76-10-1607. Evidentiary value of criminal judgment in civil proceeding.
76-10-1608. Separability clause.
76-10-1601. Short title. This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah
Racketeering Influences and Criminal Enterprise Act."
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1601, enacted by
L. 1981, ch. 94, § 1.

Title of Act.
An act relating to organized fraudulent
and illegal enterprise crime; designating the
following activities as unlawful: to use or
invest proceeds from a pattern of
racketeering conduct in an enterprise; to
acquire or maintain an interest in, or to conduct an enterprise through a pattern of

racketeering conduct; or to conspire to
engage in such conduct; providing criminal
penalties; providing for enforcement; providing civil and equitable remedies; providing
for the rights of innocent persons; and providing that any aggrieved person may institute civil proceedings to seek damages; and
providing an effective date.
This act enacts part 16, chapter 10, Title
76, Utah Code Annotated 1953. — Laws 1981,
ch. 94.

76-10-1602. Definitions. As used in this part:
(1) "Racketeering" means any act committed for financial gain which is illegal
under the laws of Utah regardless of whether such act is in fact charged or
indicted, involving:
(a) Criminal homicide;
/u\
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(c) Aggravated kidnapping or kidnapping;
(d) Forgery;
(e) Aggravated burglary or burglary;
(f) Asserting false claims including, but not limited to, false claims asserted
through fraud, arson, unlawful public assistance, or Medicaid fraud;
(g) Theft, including theft by deception, theft by extortion, theft of lost, mislaid
or mistakenly delivered property, receiving stolen property, theft of services and
theft by any person having custody of property pursuant to repair or rental agreement;
(h) Bribery;
(i) Gambling;
(j) Illegal kickbacks, including bribery to influence official or political actions
.and receiving a bribe or bribery for endorsement of a person as a public servant;
(k) Extortionate extension, collection and financing of credit;
(1) Trafficking in controlled substances, explosives, weapons or stolen property;
(m) Aggravated arson or arson;
(n) Promoting prostitution;
(o) Obstructing or hindering criminal investigations or prosecutions;
(p) False statements or publications concerning land for sale or lease or sale
of subdivided lands or sale and mortgaging of unsubdivided lands;
(q) Resale of realty with intent to defraud;
(r) Sale of unregistered securities or real property securities or transactions
involving such securities by unregistered dealers or salesmen;
(s) A scheme or artifice to defraud;
(t) Perjury;
(u) Fraud in purchase or sale of securities;
(v) The soliciting, requesting, commanding, encouraging, or intentionally aiding
another in commission of any of the above enumerated offenses;
(w) Conspiracy to commit any of the above enumerated offenses; or
(x) An attempt to commit any of the above enumerated offenses.
(2) "Person" includes any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property.
(3) "Enterprise" means any individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business trust, association or other legal entity, and any union or group
of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity, and includes illicit as
well as licit entities.
(4) "Pattern of racketeering activity" means engaging in at least two episodes
of racketeering conduct which have the same or similar objectives, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or are otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events, provided at least one of such
episodes occurred after the effective date of this part and the last of which occurred
within five years after the commission of a prior episode of racketeering conduct.
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1602, enacted by
L. 1981, ch. 94, § 1.

76-10-1603. Unlawful acts — Felony — Forfeitures. (1) It shall be unlawful
for any person who has received any proceeds derived, whether directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity in which such person has participated, as a principal, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such
proceeds, or the proceeds derived from the investment or use thereof, in the acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise.
(2) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly any interest in or control of any
enterprise.

76-10-1604
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(3) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise to conduct or participate, whether directly or indirectly, in the conduct
of such enterprise's functions through a pattern of racketeering activity.
(4) It shall be unlawful for any person to attempt or to conspire to violate any
provision of subsections (1), (2), or (3) of this section, or to solicit, request, command, encourage, or intentionally aid another in the violation of any of the provisions of subsections (1), (2), or (3) of this section,
(5) Whoever violates any subsection of section 76-10-1603 shall be guilty of a
second degree felony and in addition to the penalties prescribed by law shall forfeit
to the state of Utah:
(a) any interest acquired or maintained in violation of section 76-10-1603; and
(b) any interest in, security of, claim against, or property or contractual right
of any kind affording a source of influence over any enterprise which he has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of section 76-10-1603 of this act
(6) In any action brought by the state of Utah or, any county in the state under
this part, the district court shall have jurisdiction to enter such restraining orders
or prohibitions, and to take such other actions, including but not limited to, the
acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, in connection with any property or
other interest subject to forfeiture under this section, as it shall deem proper.
(7) Upon conviction of a person under this part, the court shall authorize the
attorney general or the county attorney to seize all property or other interest
declared forfeited under this section upon such terms and conditions as the court
shall deem proper. If a property right or other interest is not exercisable or transferable for value by the convicted person it shall expire, and shall not revert to
the convicted person.
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1603, enacted by
L. 1981, ch. 94, § 1.
76-10-1604. Enforcement authority of peace officers. Notwithstanding any
law to the contrary, peace officers in the state of Utah shall have authority to
enforce the criminal provisions of this act by initiating investigations, assisting
grand juries, obtaining indictments, filing informations, and assisting in the prosecution of criminal cases through the attorney general or county attorneys' offices.
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1604, enacted by
L. 1981, ch. 94, § 1.
76-10-1605. Remedies of person injured by pattern of racketeering activity
— Authorized orders of district court. (1) A person who sustains injury to his
person, business, or property by a pattern of racketeering activity, in which he is
not a participant, may file an action in the district court for the recovery of treble
damages, the costs of the suit, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any punitive damages the court may deem reasonable. The state or any county may file an
action on behalf of these persons injured or to prevent, restrain or remedy
racketeering as defined by this part.
(2) The district court has jurisdiction to prevent, restrain and remedy
racketeering as defined by this part after making provision for the rights of all
innocent persons affected by such violation and after hearing or trial, as appropriate, by issuing appropriate orders. The court shall determine issues by a preponderance of the evidence, and proceedings under this section shall be independent of
any other proceedings, whether civil or criminal, under the laws of this state.
(3) Prior to a determination of liability such orders may include, but are not
limited to, entering restraining orders or prohibitions or such other actions, including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, in connection with any prop-
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(4) Following a determination of liability such orders may include, but are not
limited to:
(a) Ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in
any enterprise.
(b) Imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments of
any person, including prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of
endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which aflFect the laws of
Utah, to the extent the constitutions of the United States and Utah permit.
(c) Ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise.
(d) Ordering the payment of treble damages to those persons who are not found
to be participants and are injured by the racketeering.
(e) Ordering the payment of all costs and expenses of the prosecution and investigation of any offenses included in the definition of racketeering, incurred by the
state, to be paid to the general fund of the state.
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1605, enacted by
L. 1981, ch. 94, § 1.
76-10-1606. Payments: to general fund of state. The court may order payment
to the general fund of the state as appropriate, to the extent not already ordered
to be paid in other damages, of:
(1) Any interest acquired or maintained by a person in violation of section
76-10-1603.
(2) Any interest in, security of, claims against or property or contractual rights
of any kind affording a source of influence over any enterprise which a person has
established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in
violation of section 76-10-1603.
(3) An amount equal to the gain a person has acquired or maintained through
an offense included in the definition of racketeering.
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1606, enacted by
L. 1981, ch. 94, § 1.
76-10-1607. Evidentiary value of criminal judgment in civil proceeding. A
final judgement or decree rendered in favor of the state or a county in any criminal
proceeding brought by this state or a county shall preclude the defendant from
denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent civil
proceeding.
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1607, enacted by
L. 1981, ch. 94, § 1.
76-10-1608. Separability clause. If any part of application of the Utah
Racketeering Influences and Criminal Enterprises Act is held invalid, the remainder of this part, or its application to other situations or persons, shall not be
affected.
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1608, enacted by
L. 1981, ch. 94, § 1.

Effective Date.
Section 2 of Laws 1981, ch. 94 provided:
"This act shall take effect July 1,1981."
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vJ^V IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,

A

STATE OF UTAH

MARIAN H. WEBB and JILL W.
BROWN,
Plaintiffs,

COMPLAINT
Civil No^—^bl/il-^

v.
VANTAGE INCOME PROPERTIES,
BRUCE HONEY, and STEVE HOLCOMB,
Defendants.

Plaintiffs complain of Defendants and allege as follows:
PARTIES
!•

Upon information and belief, Defendant Vantage

Income Properties ("Vantage") is believed to be a partnership
composed of James W. Andrew, Bruce Honey and Steve Holcomb as
partners, doing business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah and
conducting business as a principal real estate broker as defined
by Section 61-2-2, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended).
2.

Upon information and belief, Defendant Bruce Honey

("Honey") is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah and is
the principal broker of Vantage Income Properties.
3.

Upon information and belief, Defendant Steve
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Holcomb ("Holcomb") is a resident of Summit County, State of Utah
and doing business as a real estate sales agent for Vantage in
Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
4.

Plaintiffs Marian H. Webb and Jill w. Brown are

residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah*
JURISDICTION
5.

Jurisdiction rests in the above entitled Court

pursuant to §78-3-4 Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended).
VENUE
6.

Venue is laid pursuant to §78-13-7, Utah Code

Annotated (1953, as amended) in that the causes of action set
forth herein all arose in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
FACTS
7.

All representations, non-disclosures and acts of

Defendants described herein were performed by Steve Holcomb as a
principal partner and agent for Vantage, Honey and the other
partners of Vantage and were performed within the scope of
Holcomb's authority from Vantage, Honey and other partners; and
were performed on behalf of Vantage and Honey and the other
individual partners of Vantage as if all the relevant acts were
performed directly by Honey, Vantage and its individual partners.
8.

At all times relevant herein Defendants were

engaged in the business of selling real property for others and
during the spring and summer of 1985 were acting as the principal
real estate brokers or agents of Morris and Jo D'Leen Nesmith
("Nesmith") the owners of certain real property consisting of two
apartment complexes, a triplex and a duplex, located at 576-580,
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588, 600, and 604 Vine Street, Murray, Salt Lake County, State of
Utah (the "Property") for the purpose of selling the Property to
Plaintiffs.

The Property is more particularly described on

Exhibit "A" attached hereto and by this reference made a part
hereof.
9.

Upon information and belief, Nesmith represented to

Defendants the value of the Property, the condition of the
Property, and the profitability or lack thereof, of the Property
including income and expenses.
10.

Defendants approached Plaintiffs about purchasing

the Property and ultimately persuaded Plaintiffs to purchase the
Property.
11.

Upon information and belief, Defendants knew or had

reason to know that Plaintiffs lacked business experience,
knowledge and sophistication concerning purchasing and operating
rental and income property; and that because of this lack of
experience, knowledge and sophistication, Defendants knew or had
reason to know that Plaintiffs would not properly analyze the
condition and value of Property in determining whether to
purchase it; and that Plaintiffs further lacked the economic
means to purchase the Property and thereafter properly operate
and maintain the Property and the debts thereon and expenses
arising therefrom.
12.

During the spring and summer of 1985 and prior to

the purchase of the Property, Defendants or one or more of them
represented to Plaintiffs that:
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a.

The condition of the roofs on the two apartment

complexes on the Property needed "a couple of buckets of
tar" to repair them when in fact the cost to adequately
repair these roofs exceeded the sum of $40,000.00.
b.

Plaintiffs would not be required to pay real

property taxes for five years when in fact real property
taxes are due annually and if not paid included on the
rolls for tax sale as delinquent real property taxes.
c.

The Property had been appraised in excess of

one million dollars when in fact the Property had not
been appraised by a certified and competent appraiser
and its value was substantially less than one million
dollars.
d.

The cost to re-meter each unit was $150.00 when

in fact such cost was no less than $250.00 per unit.
e.

The income from the Property exceeded the

expenses thereon when in fact the expenses substantially
exceeded the income derived from the Property.
f.

The Property could be resold within a few weeks

after the purchase for a sales price exceeding one
million dollars when in fact no offer has ever been
tendered to Plaintiffs to purchase the Property for a
sum in excess of one million dollars and no written
offer has ever been presented to purchase the Property
from Plaintiffs exceeding $780,000.00, and the property
is worth substantially less than one million dollars.
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i.

The expenses from the Property exceeded the

income thereon.
j.

The Property could not be resold within two

weeks after the purchase from Nesmith for one million
dollars or more.
14.

Plaintiffs relied upon the representations and non-

disclosures of Defendants or one or more of them in purchasing
the Property.
15.

On or about May 28, 1985, Plaintiffs in reliance

upon the representations and non-disclosures of Defendants,
agreed to purchase the Property for $780,000.00. The terms
presented to Plaintiffs by Defendants included $80,000.00 as a
down payment, ($1,000.00 of which had been tendered as a earnest
money deposit which was held by Defendants), a $656,000.00 Note
and all-inclusive trust deed in favor of Nesmith and a $44,000.00
additional note in favor of Nesmith.
16.

Prior to July 2, 1985, Plaintiffs told Defendants

that they could not purchase the Property because they did not
have the $79,000.00 required to complete the downpayment.
Defendants represented to Plaintiffs that if Plaintiffs could
borrow approximately $34,000.00 for the downpayment for the
Nesmith's benefit, then Defendants would look to Plaintiffs for
payment of the commission after closing by taking a note for
$46,800.00 secured by a Trust Deed.
17.

Upon information and belief, prior to July 2, 1985

Defendants instructed Utah Title & Abstract Company ("Utah
Title"), the closing agent and title insurance company, to
prepare closing statements with terms directly contrary to those
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amount if Plaintiffs would pay Defendants another real estate
commission.
21.

Upon information and belief, the value of the

Property is approximately $550/000.00.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Racketeering)
22.

Plaintiffs reallege all the preceding paragraphs as

though specifically set forth at length hereat.
23.

Defendants are an enterprise, within the meaning of

§76-10-1602(3), engaged in the business of buying and selling
real property for others within the meaning of §61-2-1 et. seq.
Utah Code Annotated.
24.

Defendants, as persons within the meaning of §76-

10-1602(2), Utah Code Ann., through a pattern of racketeering
activity acquired directly or indirectly an interest in the
Property in violation of §76-10-1603(2), Utah Code Ann. The
racketeering activity includes acts committed for financial gain
involving (a) a scheme or artifice to defraud, (b) false
statements or publications concerning land for sale and the sale
and mortgaging of unsubdivided lands and (c) resale of realty
with intent to defraud.

The numerous episodes of racketeering

which constitute this pattern of racketeering are those acts
representations and non-disclosures described in paragraphs 12,
13, 16, 19 and 20.
25.

Vantage, Honey and Holcomb as persons within the

meaning of §76-10-1602(2) and as persons employed by or
associated with said enterprise, conducted and participated,
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$30,000.00.
c.

Execution of a $16,000.00 Trust Deed in favor of

Defendant Vantage Income Properties.
28.

By reason of Defendants1 violation of §76-10-1601

et. seg. Utah Code Ann., Plaintiffs are entitled, pursuant to
§76-10-1605(1), Utah Code Ann., to treble damages of $189,814.98,
the costs of this suit, including a reasonable attorneys fees in
an amount not less than $30,000.00, and punitive damages in a sum
not less than $300,000.00 together with interest thereon at the
legal rate of ten percent (10%) per annum.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Fraud and Deceit)
29«

Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 21

inclusive as though specifically set forth at length hereat.
30.

During the late spring and summer-of 1985,

Defendants or one or more of them, did knowingly or recklessly
make representations and non-disclosures to Plaintiffs of
presently existing material facts more fully described in
paragraphs 12, 13, 16, 19 and 20 herein.
31.

That these representations and non-disclosures were

material to the Plaintiffs in connection with the subject
transaction.
32.

Defendants or one or more of them made these

representations and non-disclosures for the

purpose of inducing

Plaintiffs to act upon them.
33.

Plaintiffs reasonably believed these

representations to be true and in ignorance of their falsity, did
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integrity, truthfulness, reputation, competency and fair dealing.
40.

Defendants breached these duties in that they were

in a superior position to know the material facts described in
paragraphs 12, 13, 16, 19 and 20 above and carelessly and
negligently made false representations and non-disclosures
concerning these facts to Plaintiffs for the purpose of inducing
Plaintiffs to rely and act thereon.
41.

Plaintiffs reasonably believed these

representations to be true and, in ignorance of their falsity,
justifiably relied thereon in entering into a contract to
purchase the Property, in purchasing the Property and in
attempting to resell the Property and suffered injury and damage
as a direct and proximate result of misrepresentations and nondisclosures of Defendants.
42.

Plaintiffs are entitled to rescission of the trust

deed note and trust deed in favor of Vantage, restitution of all
payments in an amount not less than $33,271.66, consequential
damages in an amount not less than $30,000.00, costs including a
reasonable attorneys fee, punitive damages in an amount not less
than $300,000.00 and whatever additional relief the Court deems
proper.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Constructive Fraud)
43.

Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 21

inclusive, as though specifically set forth at length hereat.
44.

The agency relationship of Defendants with Nesmith

and Plaintiffs and the other circumstances surrounding the
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$33,271.66/ for consequential damages in an amount not less than
$30/000.00/ costs including a reasonable attorneys fee, punitive
damages in an amount not less than $300/000.00 and whatever
additional relief the Court deems proper.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress)
50.

Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 21

inclusive, as though specifically set forth at length hereat.
51.

During the late spring and summer of 1985,

Defendants or one or more of them represented to Plaintiffs the
certain presently existing facts described in paragaphs 12, 13,
16, 19 and 20.
52.

Plaintiffs reasonably believed these

representations to be true and justifiably relied upon them in
entering into the contract to purchase the Property purchasing
the Property and attempting to resell the Property.
53.

The acts of Defendants were done wilfully,

maliciously, outrageously, deliberately and purposely with the
intention to inflict emotional distress upon Plaintiffs and/or
were done in reckless disregard of the probability of causing
Plaintiffs' emotional distress and these acts did in fact result
in severe and extreme emotional distress to Plaintiffs.
54.

As a direct and proximate result of these acts and

misrepresentations, Plaintiffs were caused to incur severe and
grievous mental and emotional suffering, fright, anguish, shock,
nervousness, and anxiety.
anxious and nervous.

Plaintiffs continue to be fearful,
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consequential damages in an amount not less than $30,000.00,
punitive damages in an amount not less than $300,000.00, costs
including a reasonable attorneys fee, and whatever additional
relief the Court deems proper.
4.

For their Fourth Cause of Action, for rescission of

the trust deed note and trust deed in favor of Vantage, for a
judgment of restitution against Vantage, Honey and Holcomb,
jointly and severally, in an amount not less than $33,271.66, for
consequential damages in an amount not less than $30,000.00,
punitive damages in an amount not less than $300,000.00, costs
including a reasonable attorneys fee, and whatever additional
relief the Court deems proper.
5.

For their Fifth Cause of Action, for compensatory

damages in the sum of $100,000.00 and punitive damages in the sum
of $300,000.00.
6.

For such other and further relief the Court deems

proper in these circumstances.
DATED this

day of

%kSo\r^O^\

1986.

CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN

ames L. Christensel
aul D. Newton
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Address of Plaintiffs:
2364 Evergreen Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
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1

Q

Have you used them?

2

A

I have used those words, yeah.

3

I would be lying if I

said I have never used those words.

4

Q

What have you used those words in connection with?

5

A

All sorts of things.

6

Q

Give me some examples that you would use them in

7
8
9

connection with.
A

I have got to jam my shoe on because it's too tight.

Are you talking about in conjunction with real estate?

10

Q

Yes.

11

A

Mostly I used those words because I said, "I don't
You can f t be

12

like to see that sort of thing happening here.

13

jamming someone into an apartment house and expect them to be a

14

long-time customer."

15

that we did business over and over and over with people.

16

bought an apartment house, fixed it up, and sold it and they

17

bought another one and fixed it up and sold it.

One of the things about our company was
They

You don't just

18

sell somebody a building and run and hide like most real estate

19

agents.

20

their career and that's it.

21

business with their customers over and over and over.

22
23
24

25 J

Most real estate agents sell one or two buildings in
People that worked for me did
Our

business was about 70 percent repeat business.
Q

Would it be fair to characterize another philosophy

of VIP to not cram or jam buildings to people?
A

That's right.

I t d o e s n ' t do you any good,

ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
420 KEARNS BUILDING
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84101

UUUU23

1

there.

2

Q

| My Mi

*

('In istPTisPi |i

\

"he lact

3

that about 70 percent of your bu^j.i,t oo <v^> .cptu; business,

4

Did you have some sort of

il^t ..»i - .• . eople

< customer

5' wen e
6

N-O you

•

i to

VIP.

7

A

I think

I qot that f Lqure from a list of sales that

6

] c: ::>] ;: back

9

to

set--

w r..

we hdhi

ti;*' p e o p l e

• •*

* hHTTf

were

that

bou-.^t

xnd h o w m a n y t h e y

Q

Were

they

A

Yeah.

Q

Wliei I y

the

same

t;^

bought

b u i i d JLIH-U. a i id

from

us,

arid

where

:n

was

people?

i

--

. -

•

"i.a 1 PI>S

were people who ;; >.* r,:-; ;• .* business wi-h betore?
If,, |

A

Yeah.

I carri^

-v':i«:h * re when people c.ij

or D«^r- 'v.

^

about

tv

m

^n tup start ar Income

*p« J

I

t

IH*-MI

t uouse listed

in *-h<* ^pwsparn^ M I P fir^i couple m" vears, th^ first W»A
,

* ^
*"J1-1*- <

24

seJao.T.

25

basically

•- 'usiness — 9 0 pciceni

*

:^binesb was wit.i people

^* already dono business with

i ^L'.run . t n i . . .«.

A :f
..

*. L «,* '
.

uston^r;

less- •

They m s t

continued to

i., r * .
' , *m

and

* ,
MHH

cn;jfc;.

ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REP( )RTERS
420 K E A R N S B U I L D I N G

59
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101

UUUU24

ownership?
A

No.

Q

What has happened to all the income properties you

had owned?
A

I have either sold them, disposed of them, traded

them, gotten rid of them.
Commercial Interiors.
Q

I have got plenty to do at

I don't have time for apartment houses.

I want to go back for just a moment to the

partnership with Honey and VIP.

You stated that the reason

that you dissolved the partnership was mutual.
understand why you split up the partnership.

I would like to

What specific

event caused the two of you to decide to split up the
partnership?
A

There was no specific event.

Q

Any reason for splitting it up?

A

Yeah, I just got tired of working with him.

Q

Had VIP or you or Mr. Honey or the two of you ever

purchased any properties back for people that you had worked
for agents for in the sale of property?
A

Yes.

Q

How many times and how many properties?

A

Two that I can think of,

Q

Tell me about the first one, when it occurred, who

the buyers were that you purchased it from.
A

The first one I think was a duplex on Edmunds Avenue
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
34
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1

now, but he asked us if we wanted to take it and we said yeah,

2

we would.

3

50,000 bucks, 40,000 bucks.

It was a small duplex, maybe worth—I don't know,

4

Q

So why did you buy it from him?

5

A

The company needed—the company had made in profit,

6

we needed a little depreciation.

7

a couple of them had expressed some interest in maybe wanting

8

to go manage it for us.

9

signed a deed over to us.

10
11
12
13

14

Q
A

We had several agents there,

So I said, "We'll take it."

He just

We didn't pay anything for it.

This was Danny Burnette?
Yes.

Q

You say there was another property you did something

like that?
A

There were some people that bought a piece of

15

property from us on—boy, I don't remember—if I can remeinber

16

the street, about 13th South.

17

Q

You say they bought it from you?

13

A

From the company—not from the company, they bought

19

it through us.

20

Q

You represented the seller?

2i

A

And buyers.

22

Q

And the buyers?

23

A

We were—we did all that in our company and they were

24

kind of skiddish and they didn't want to buy it, then they did

25

and they didn't.

The people do that all the time.
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1

A

Glen Stevens.

2

Q

Any other situations like that the entire time you

3

were with VIP where you had purchased back a property from a

4

buyer for one reason or another?

5

that's probably not the right way to put it. Whenever you

6

purchased a property from a buyer for one reason or another—

7
8
9
10

A

when I say purchased back,

Those are the only ones that I can remember.

There

may be some others, but as far as I can remember, that's all.
Q

On the second one, can you recall approximately the

date?

11

A

1982, I think.

12

Q

What I would like to do now is shift out of all of

13

this general questioning and go straight to the Vine Street

14

property that is the subject of the lawsuit.

15

which property I'm referring to?

Are you aware of

16

A

I think I am.

What do you mean specifically?

17

Q

The Vine Street property that Marian Webb and Jill

18

Brown, the Plaintiffs in this lawsuit, purchased from Nesmith.

19

Are you aware of the property?

20
21

22

A

I think so.

Q

I will be referring to it as the Vine Street property

from this point forward.

23

A

All right.

24

Q

Mr. and Mrs. Nesmith were the sellers of the

25

property?
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
420 KEAfiiNS BUILOING
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84101

88

000029
James L. Christensen, USB No. A0639
Paul D. Newton, USB No. 4382
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
215 South State Street, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 534-0909
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MARIAN H. WEBB and JILL W.
BROWN,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION
OF DOCUMENTS

v.

)

Civil No. C86-1302

VANTAGE INCOME PROPERTIES,
BRUCE HONEY, and STEVE
HOLCOMB,

)
)
)

Judge Timothy Hanson

Defendants.

)

Plaintiffs, by

and through their counsel of record, and

pursuant to Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby
requests

the Defendant Bruce Honey to produce the following-

described documents for inspection and copying at the offices of
James L. Christensen, attorney for Plaintiffs, 215 South State
Street,

Suite

800, Salt

Lake

City, Utah, or

at

such

other

reasonable location as Plaintiff or his attorney may designate
within thirty (30) days from the date of this request.
Request No. 1.

A copy of the document dissolving Vantage

Income Properties.
Request No. 2.

A copy of the Vantage Income Properties*

Training Manual for appraisers and salesmen.
Request No. 3.

Names of all of Steve Holcomb's customers

while he was at Vantage Income Properties.

000030
Request No, 4.

The record for all sales at Vantage Income

Properties.
Request No. 5.

A market analysis form of Vantage Income

Properties.
Request

No.

6.

A

work-up

sheet

of

Vantage

Income

Properties.
Request

No.

7.

A

sales

training

information

sheet

of

Vantage Income Properties.
Request No. 8.

A neighborhood survey prepared by Vantage

Income Properties.
Request No. 9.

A copy of the listing

agreement

between

Vantage Income Properties and Morris and Jo D'leen Nesmith.
Request No. 10.

A copy of Bruce Honey's 1985 and 1986 tax

returns.
DATED this

C"??— day of February, 1987.
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN

James L.Christens^n
Paul D. Newton
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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1

PILED iN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt }<e County Utah

APR 101987
James L. Christensen, USB No. A0639
Paul D. Newton, USB No. 4382
CORBTRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
215 South State Street, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 534-0909

\!

H. Dixon Kinciley, Cler&3rd Dist. Court

Byth.
1

*L„)

&*-***ir****"

1

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MARIAN H. WEBB and JILL W.
BROWN,

ORDER COMPELLING
RESPONSE TO DISCOVERY

Plaintiffs,
v.

Civil No. C86-1302

VANTAGE INCOME PROPERTIES,
BRUCE HONEY, and STEVE HOLCOMB,
Judge Timothy Hanson
Defendants.

Plaintiffs' motion to compel came on for hearing before the
above-entitled court on April 8, 1987 at 1:30 p.m.; plaintiffs
were represented by Paul D. Newton, and defendants were presented
by Terry C. Turner and Michael S. Eldredge; and the court having
heard arguments of counsel including defendants' oral motion for
a protective order prohibiting any discovery and having reviewed
the file, pleadings, and other documents represented to the court
for the purpose of these motions and good cause appearing
therefor,
NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED
as follows:
1.

Defendants' oral motion for a protective order is

hereby denied;

?

UUUU3Z
2.

Plaintiffs' motion to compel defendants Steve Holcomb

and Vantage Income Properties to respond to their request for
production of documents is granted;
3*

By April 9, 1987, Defendants mu^t respond to plaintiffs

request for production of documents da£ed February 23, 1987,
DATED this

V

day of April/1987

lorable Timothy Hanson
/District Court Judge

ATTEST
H.DJX0NH1NDLEY

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

C e o jtv Ci c

T^fry C/ Turner 7
Attorney for defendants
Steve Holcomb and Vantage
Income Properties

4
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Michael S. Eldredge (USB#0967)
Terry C. Turner (USB#3299)
Attorneys for Defendants
5295 South 320 West, Suite 540
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone 263-1511
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

MARIAN H. WEBB and JILL W.
BROWN,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES
TO PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST
FOR PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS

VANTAGE INCOME PROPERTIES,
BRUCE HONEY, and STEVE
HOLCOMB,

Civil No. C-86-1302
Judge Timothy Hansen

Defendants.
* * * * * * *

COME NOW Defendants Holcomb and Vantage Income Properties, and
pursuant to the Order of the Court entered herein on October 5,
1987, supplement their responses to Plaintiffs1 Request for Production
of Documents as previously delivered to Plaintiffs on April 8, 1987.
Request No. 1.

A copy of the document dissolving Vantage Income

Properties.
Response:
Request No, 2.

Said document was produced on April 8, 1987.
A copy of the Vantage Income Properties' Training

Manual for appraisers and salesmen.
Response:

Said document was erroneously indicated as having

been produced on April 8, 1987, however, Defendants have been
unable to locate such documents.

Defendants have no objection to

producing such documents and will continue their efforts to locate
such documents and produce them if and when they are available.
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Request No. 3,

Names of all of Steve Holcomb^ customers while he

was at Vantage Income Properties.
Response:

Such information does not exist on a single document,

however can be derived from the sales records of Vantage Income
Properties.

Defendants object to producing such information and/or

documents, and invoke their 5th amendment privilege against selfincrimination for the following reasons.

Plaintiffs have stated

repeatedly, in their oral arguments before this Court on April 8,
1987, in their Memorandum in Support of Striking Defendants' Answer
on file herein, and in their oral argument before this Court on
October 5, 1987, that the expressed purpose of obtaining information
under this request is to discover information that will support
their claims under the First Cause of Action in the Complaint
herein against Defendants for alleged violations of the Utah Racketeering Influences and Criminal Enterprise Act ("RICE") specifically
enumerated in §§ 76-10-1602(p),(q) and (s).
The specific provisions allegedly violated by Defendants, as
set forth in the First Cause of Action in the Complaint herein,
constitute a second degree felony in the State of Utah.

§§ 76-

10-1602 and 76-10-1603 state that a "pattern of racketeering
activity" must be proved to establish liability.

Plaintiffs

further assert in their First, Second and Fourth Causes of Action
that Defendants have committed acts or omissions that would
constitute criminal violations of the Communications Fraud statute
found at § 76-10-1801 of the Criminal Code which would also
constitute a second degree felony.
-2-
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Plaintiffs seek to support their allegations of racketeering
in the Complaint herein by "fishing" through the sales records and
customers of Steve Holcomb in an attempt to find anyone who might
join in Plaintiffs' criminal allegations and thus establish a
"pattern of racketeering activity." This was expressly represented
by Paul Newton, counsel for Plaintiffs at the hearing on October
5, 1987, who stated substantially, or words to the effect, that
Plaintiffs wanted to find other customers who were no longer
"loyal" to Mr. Holcomb, and assist Plaintiffs in their efforts to
"get him off the streets."
If Defendants are required to produce such documents, and, if
Plaintiffs are successful in establishing sufficient evidence from
such records that Defendants have indeed violated provisions of
RICE and thus committed a second degree felony, then such violations
shall have been established through their own testimony, in direct
conflict with their expressed desire and constitutional privilege
not to provide any testimony that would tend to incriminate
themselves.

It is well established that Plaintiffs have a

burden of establishing such criminal liability on the face of
their complaint in order to obtain the treble damages they seek
as civil relief under §76-10-1605.

If Plaintiffs have carried

their burden, there is no need for further supportive discovery.
If they have not pleaded violations of RICE sufficient to establish
liability under RICE, which in this case is clear they have not,
then they cannot force Defendants, in violation of their 5th
amendment rights, to provide information that could be used in
-3-
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any way to establish such liability and prove that Defendants had
indeed committed a second degree felony.
Plaintiffs assert that Defendant Holcomb has previously waived
his 5th amendment rights in testimony found on pages 48, 54, 59,
60, and 84-88 of Mr. Holcomb1s deposition of December 4, 1986,
which deposition remains unpublished in this action.

Defendants

assert that Defendant Holcomb has made no representation whatsoever
on those pages, or at any other part of said deposition that he has
committed any act that can be construed as a criminal violation of
RICE or any other criminal statute that would constitute a waiver
of his 5th amendment rights, nor has he testified to any matter
therein that can only be verified or established by a review of the
sales records of Vantage Income Properties or customer lists of
Steve Holcomb.
Mr. Newton argued before the Court on October 5, 1987 that Mr.
Holcomb had testified that there were numerous times that he had
to take property back, implying to the Court that Mr. Holcomb had
committed alleged criminal acts.

As clearly stated on the pages

referred to by Plaintiffs1 counsel in the deposition, each decision
by Mr. Holcomb to take property back was based on a business judgment
that served the interests of all parties concerned, and in no
instance were the Defendants ever compelled to take back such
properties.
In summary, Defendants object to providing information in the
sales records or from Mr. Holcomb's list of customers on the basis
that any information found by Plaintiffs in such records and lists
-4-
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that could support their expressed goal of proving their allegations
of criminal violations by Defendants, and establish a pattern of
racketeering, or any other provision of the RICE or Communications
Fraud statutes, would accordingly be incriminating, and consequently
Defendants invoke their 5th amendment right not to testify in any
manner against themselves.

This objection is supported by Defendants

Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs1 Motion to Strike Defendants1
Answer which was previously filed in this matter and argued before
the Court on October 5, 1987, which memorandum is incorporated
herein by reference.
Request No. 4.
Response:

The record for all sales at Vantage Income Properties,
Defendants incorporate their response to Request

No. 3 as if fully set forth herein.
Request No. 5.
Response:
Request No. 6.
Response:
Request No. 7.

A market analysis form of Vantage Income Properties.
Said document was produced on April 8, 1987.
A work-up sheet of Vantage Income Properties.
Said document was produced on April 8, 1987.
A sales training information sheet of Vantage

Income Properties.
Response:
Request No. 8.

Said document was produced on April 8, 1987.
A neighborhood survey prepared by Vantage Income

Properties.
Response:
Request No. 9.

Said document was produced on April 8, 1987.
A copy of the listing agreement between Vantage

Income Properties and Morris and Jo D'leen Nesmith.
Response:

Upon review of the records and documents of the
-5-
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transactions between Nesmiths and Plaintiffs, Defendants have
been unable to locate a listing agreement between Nesmiths and
Vantage Income Properties.

Defendants believe that no such

agreement was ever entered into, and that Nesmiths negotiated
with Plaintiffs solely on the basis of the earnest money offer
presented by Plaintiffs, after Vantage Income Properties had
determined from Nesmiths that they were interested selling their
property if a suitable offer were made.

This practice is not

uncommon in the industry.
Request No. 10.
Response:

A copy of the 1986 tax return for Steve Holcorab.
Said document is expected to be available on or

about October 15, 1987 when Mr. Holcomb's extension for filing
will expire^

It will be forwarded to Plaintiffs immediately as
yr\

it becomes available.
DATED this, Z6/^

day of C v 6 ^ % ^ t
//

UtfLos^*

MICKAELSTEL&REBGE
Co-counsel for Defendants

-6-
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Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Supplemental Responses to Plaintiffs' Request
For Production of Documents to James L. Christensen, Esq* and
Paul D. Newton, Esq., counsel for Plaintiffs, at CORBRIDGE, BAIRD
&
CHRISTENSEN, 215
215 South
South S
State
Street^
800, Salt Lake City,
& CHRISTENSEN,
tate S
t r e e t , Suite
Suit
Utah 84111, t h i s

/H ^

day of

C

r

A£/l
JdS/>Jl

-7-

,

1987.
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James L. Christensen (Bar No. A0639)
Paul D. Newton (Bar No, 4382)
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
215 South State, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 534-0909

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah
0CT

2 61987

H Dtfon Hindley,

OrnkptS?*****
Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MARIAN H. WEBB and JILL W.
BROWN,
ORDER
Plaintiffs,
vs.
VANTAGE INCOME PROPERTIES,
BRUCE HONEY and STEVE
HOLCOMB,
Defendantse

Civil No. C86-1302
Judge Timothy Hanson

On October 5, 1987, plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendants1
Answer and enter default judgment came on for hearing before the
above-entitled

court.

Plaintiffs were represented by Paul D.

Newton and defendants were represented by Michael S. Eldredge,
The court, having reviewed the pleadings and other documents on
file, having heard arguments of counsel and good cause appearing
therefor, does hereby order, adjudge and decree as follows:
1.

Defendant Bruce Honey is hereby ordered to respond to

plaintiffs1 Third Set of Request for Production of Documents.
2.

Also under the Third Set of Request for Production of

Documents, defendants Steve Holcomb and Vantage Income Properties
are hereby ordered to modify the response to request no. 2 to
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show that the document requested cannot be located and was not
delivered to plaintiffs.
3.

Because

defendants

Steve Holcomb

and Vantage

Income

Properties failed to meet their burdens to provide the court with
sufficient

information

from

which

the

court

could

make

an

intelligent evaluation of the claim of privilege against selfincrimination,

defendants

Properties

are

hereby

sufficient

information

Steve

ordered
from

Holcomb
to

which

and

provide
the

Vantage
the

court

court
can

Income
with

make

an

intelligent evaluation of their claim of privilege against selfincrimination as asserted in these defendants1 initial response
to request nos. 3 and 4 under Plaintiffs' Third Set of Request
for Production of Documents.
4.

The

deadline

for

the

responses

required

under

paragraphs 1, 2 , and 3 above is October 15, 1987.
5.

The court hereby preserves its ruling on plaintiffs'

Motion under Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to
strike defendants1 Answer and enter default judgment pending the
defendants' compliance with all orders herein within the required
time limit of October 15, 1987, and then the court will grant or
deny plaintiffs' motion.
6.

Plaintiffs' Motion

for Attorney's

Fees and Costs is

hereby granted subject to the court's later determination of the
sum to award.

*
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DATED t h i s

<?£ day

of

, 1987,

fge Timothy Hanson

ATTEST
H. DIXON HtWDvEV

A p p r o v e d As To Form:
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)
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Michael S* Eldredge
Co-Counsel for Defendants
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r,;
James L. Christensen (Bar No. A0639)
Paul D. Newton (Bar No. 4382)
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
215 South State, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 534-0909

PEC 15 1937

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MARIAN H. WEBB and JILL W.
BROWN,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND TO
PUBLISH DEPOSITION OF
DEFENDANT STEVE HOLCOMB

vs.
VANTAGE INCOME PROPERTIES,
BRUCE HONEY, and STEVE
HOLCOMB,

Civil No. C86-1302

Defendants.

Judge Timothy Hansen

On December 7, 1987, at 2:00 p.m., plaintiffs' Motion for
Sanctions and to Publish Deposition of Defendant Steve Holcomb
came on for hearing before the above-entitled court.
were

represented

by

Paul

D.

Newton

and

Plaintiffs

defendants

were

represented by Michael S. Eldredge and Terry C. Turner.

The

court, having reviewed the pleadings and other documents on file,
having heard arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing
therefor,
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

In his deposition taken on December 4, 1986, defendant

Steve Holcomb testified that "Our company was very proud of the
fact that in the hundreds of apartment houses that we sold, we
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had very few people that were dissatisfied with the service that
we had performed."

Plaintiffs have a right to verify the truth

of the preceding statement and others like it.

By making such a

statement, defendants waived their right to raise the Fifth
Amendment under the U.S. Constitution as an objection and
privilege to Request Nos. 3 and 4 under plaintiffs1 Request for
Production of Documents dated February 23, 1987.
2.

Defendants cannot assert the Fifth Amendment as an

objection and privilege to plaintiffs' request for production of
documents when defendants have failed to show and would not
represent that there is anything contained within such documents
that is incriminating.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiffs' Motion to Publish Deposition of Steve

Holcomb is granted.
2.

Defendants have not met their burden in asserting the

Fifth Amendment and have not complied with paragraph 3 of the
court's Order dated October 26, 1987, requiring
information

sufficient

from which the court can make an intelligent

evaluation of defendants' claim of privilege against self
incrimination.
3.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions is granted subject to

the following conditions:
a.

Within ten (10) days of the date of this Order,

defendants

shall produce

to plaintiffs copies of the

documents requested by plaintiffs under their Request for
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Production of Documents dated February 23, 1987, request
nos. 3 and 4;
b.

In the event defendants

fail to produce to

plaintiffs the documents requested by request nos. 3 and 4,
then plaintiffs, by ex parte motion supported by affidavit,
may move the court for an order striking defendants'
pleadings and Answers and granting plaintiffs judgment
against defendants as prayed for in plaintiffs' Complaint.
4.

Because defendants have asserted the Fifth Amendment

without any foundation, plaintiffs are entitled to their costs,
including attorney's fees, for the hearings on October 5, 1987,
and December 7, 1987, which sums the court shall determine at a
/

later date.
DATED this

/±

day of December, 1957.

ibnofable Timothy Hanson
Approved As To Form:
ATTEST
Michael S. Eldredge
Terry C. Turner
/
Co-Counsel for Defendants
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these cover concepts of proximate cause.

But just to be

extraordinarily cautious in this matter, I think it's
appropriate to allow that inquiry, and I will consider
it.

And I'm not going to assume for the sake of this

ruling that the defendants are foreclosed from examining
the question of proximate cause, because I intend to
examine it in this ruling.
The knowledge we need to keep in mind here is that
on the first cause of action, there was no question
about, it starts on page eight of the complaint, and
paragraph twenty-two, which is the first paragraph in the
first cause of action, which alleges the Rice claim under
Section 76-10-1601, I believe, and following sections of
the Utah Code, it incorporates all proceeding paragraphs.
And those preceding paragraphs are the basis for, at
least in part, the claim under the racketeering cause of
action.

And I don't like that word, because that implies

something that's not there.

It implies some criminal

conduct that is not envisioned by a civil statute.
In any event, it's this action.

I prefer to call it

a fraud cause of action, statutory fraud cause of action,
because that's really what it is.

I think the code that

deals with this statute specifically indicates.

For

example, in Section 76-10-1604, talking about —

excuse

me, 1605, talking about remedies, and damages, and et

Bunnv C. Neuenschwander, CSR. RPR

A
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cetera, the legislature in sub part three indicate that
the action is grounded in fraud action and go on to state
that it's subject to arbitration under Chapter 31, Title
78.
That suggests to me that what the legislature had in
mind that this is a traditional fraud claim, but it has
been reduced to common law fraud, reduced to statute and
adopted by the legislature in a particular set of
circumstances.

And while common law fraud can encompass

any activity, this is limited to the Rice statute —

is

limited to the activities described in the statute
itself, but it is a fraud statute.

And I prefer to use

that term rather than racketeering.
That envisions all kinds of mob things with all the
traditional concepts that run with that type of language,
and that just doesn't have to be present in an action
brought under this statute.

In any event, paragraphs

seven through twenty-one are encompassed in the first
cause of action.

First cause of action is one in which

the default has been entered, and you all understand why
the default is there, and we don't need to discuss that
further, but in any event, the default is there, and
that's where we are.
The principle note, one of the allegations in
paragraph eleven —

I don't mean to exclude the others,

Bunny C. Neuenschwander, CSR, RPR

5
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James L. Christensen (Bar No. A0639)
Paul D. Newton (Bar No. 4382JL
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
215 South State Street, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 534-0909

MAR 2 8 1988
3rd Oist. Court
oputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MARION H. WEBB and JILL W,
BROWN,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT
ON PLAINTIFFS' FIRST
CAUSE OF ACTION

Plaintiff,
v.
VANTAGE INCOME PROPERTIES
BRUCE HONEY, and STEVE
HOLCOMB,

Civil No. C86-1302

Defendants.
Pursuant

to

^h,Q\e>K\Q.^SS
3-a<VS%-%4bc-v^

Judge Timothy Hanson

(a) Plaintiffs*

Motion to Strike Defendants'

Answer and Enter Default Judgment dated September 18, 1987; (b)
Plaintiffs1

Motion

Order Granting

for Sanctions dated October

29, 1987; (c)

Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions dated December

15, 1987; (d) Plaintiffs' Ex Parte Motion for an Order Striking
Defendants' Pleadings and answers and Granting Plaintiffs Default
Judgment

against

Defendants;

(e)

Affidavit

of

James

L.

Christensen in Support of Ex parte Motion; (f) the Court's Order
arising

out of

a hearing

on January

4,

1988; (g) Defendants

Notice of Intent Not to Produce Documents dated January 21, 1988;
(h) Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendants' Answers and Grant
Plaintiffs' Judgment; and (i) An evidentiary hearing on February
9, 1988 during which the Court took evidence on the issues of
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causation and damages, the court having previously ruled on
February

1, 1988 that Plaintiffs1 were entitled to default

judgment on their first cause of action and the Court being fully
advised in the premises and having reviewed the pleadings and
other documents on file and having heard arguments of counsel and
having taken evidence on the issues of causation and damages and
good cause appearing therefore, the Court hereby makes the
following findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment:
FINDINGS OF FACT
Based upon defendants' default and the evidence received by
the Court, the Court hereby makes the following findings of fact
as to defendants Vantage Income Properties and Bruce Honey
(hereinafter "Defendants"):
lc

The factual allegations contained in paras. 7 through

21 of Plaintiffs' complaint are deemed true.
2.
lacked

Defendants knew or had reason to know that plaintiffs
business

experience, knowledge

and

sophistication

concerning purchasing and operating rental income property or
real estate generally, especially buying and holding real estate
for the short term,
3.

Plaintiffs' intended to hold the Clearbrook property

for a short period of time; the principal purpose in purchasing
this property was to turn it around, and not to keep it.
4.

Epco is an assumed name and has no impact on the

hearing on damages.
5.

Plaintiffs bought the Clearbrook property because of
2
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the

representations

of defendants; plaintiffs would not have

bought the property otherwise.
6.

Defendants knew of the plaintiff's line of credit from

which plaintiff Marion H. Webb borrowed most of the down payment
used for purchasing the Clearbrook property.
7.

Plaintiffs paid $35,000.00 as a down payment for the

purchase of the Clearbrook property.
8.

Plaintiffs

incurred

interest

expense because of the

credit line loan.

pay

9.

Plaintiff Marion Webb f s need to obtain a mortgage to

off

the

credit

line

was

a reasonably

foreseeable

act

resulting from defendants fraudulent conduct
10.

Plaintiffs have incurred interest expense of $10,791.92

in payments on the credit line and the new mortgage.
11.

Plaintiffs

have

incurred

closing

costs of

$2,005.63

which were proximately related and reasonably foreseeable because
of the fraudulent acts of defendants.
12.

Plaintiffs have incurred attorneys fees in the amount

of $6,521.00.
13.

Neither

defendant Vantage

Income Properties nor its

successors has made demand upon plaintiff

for payment of the

trust deed note in the amount of $16,000.00 dated July 2, 1985.
14.

The trust deed securing the above trust deed note was

subject to a senior mortgage.
15.

The senior mortgage has been foreclosed.

16.

The

Court makes

no

findings
3

as to

defendant

Steve
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Holcomb who filed a petition for relief in bankruptcy, File No,
88A-00959 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District
Court of Utah, Central Division.
17c

The Findings, Conclusions and Judgment contained herein

are the same as those previously served upon defendants' counsel
by mailing

on

February

16, 1988 except

that no

finding

nor

conclusion is made nor judgment entered against Steve Holcomb.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, the court hereby
makes the following conclusions of law:
1.

Pursuant to prior orders of the court, plaintiffs are

entitled to an order striking defendants' answers and pleadings
regarding plaintiffs' first cause of action and plaintiffs are
entitled to a default judgment on their first cause of action.
2.

Defendants have defrauded plaintiffs.

3.

Damages discussed in the findings were all reasonably

foreseeable

and

proximately

caused by defendants

in light of

their fraudulent conduct.
4.

Damages

are

to

be

trebled

pursuant

to

Utah

Code

Annotated § 76-10-1605 (as enacted in 1981) which section governs
this case.
5.

The

court's order disposes of significant

issues of

this case.
6.

Plaintiffs have not been damaged by Defendants failure

to demand payment of the $16,000.00 trust deed note.
7.

The principal reason for plaintiffs' loss was the fraud
4

•i^^^O
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of defendants•
8.

The $16,000.00 trust deed note is unsecured.

9.

The court reserves the right to include Steve Holcomb

in these findings and conclusions and judgment herein at such
time as the automatic stay in his bankruptcy does not apply.
ORDER GRANTING DEFAULT JUDGMENT
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law, the court hereby orders, adjudges and decrees as follows:
le

Pursuant

to Rule

Procedure, the court

54(b) of the Utah

expressly

determines

Rules of Civil

and concludes that

there is no just reason for delay and expressly directs that a
final judgment be entered on plaintiffs' first cause of action
which judgment is entitled to direct appeal to the Utah Supreme
Court.
2.

The answer and pleadings of defendants Vantage Income

Properties and Bruce

Honey are hereby stricken as to plaintiffs1

first cause of action.
3.

Plaintiffs

are

granted

judgment

against

defendants

Vantage Income Properties and Bruce Honey, jointly and severally,
for actual and consequential damages in the sum of $47,077.55.
4.
hereby
enacted

Under plaintiffs' first cause of action, damages are
trebled

pursuant

in 1981) and

to Utah

judgment

Code Ann.

§ 76-10-1605

is hereby granted

(as

in favor of

Plaintiffs and against all defendants Vantage Income Properties
and Bruce Honey, jointly and severally, for the additional sum of
$94,155.10.
5
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Plaintiffs

are hereby

awarded

judgment

against

all

defendants Vantage Income Properties and Bruce Honey, jointly and
severally, for attorneys fees in the amount of $6,521.00.
6.

Plaintiffs are entitled to interest on all of the above

money judgments at the legal rate of 12% until such judgments are
paid in full.
7.

To

stay

Plaintiffs

enforcement

of

the

above

money

judgments, Defendants must post a supersedeas bond in the sum of
$53,598.55 or an appropriate property bond in double the amount
of money damages (not trebled)
8c

The

court

reserves

judgment/against

defendant

Steve

Holcomb.
DATED this

day of

// /fl^L^

1988.

BY/THe\CQURT

/Jiidge Timothy Hanson
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